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Abstract
The current wave of globalization has raised serious concerns of many countries whether
increasing outward foreign direct investment (FDI) will cause the hollowing out of their
domestic economies. In this paper we use Taiwan as a case study to examine the interrelation-
ship between foreign production and domestic production with a special focus on the role of
reverse imports. We show that without considering reverse imports properly, the empirical
results may be biased or even reversed. By endogenizing a ﬁrm’s decisions on reverse imports
as well as on domestic and foreign production, we show that foreign production has no
signiﬁcant substitution e#ect on domestic production, but it may have a signiﬁcantly negative
e#ect on domestic production indirectly through variables related to ﬁrms’ characteristics,
such as ﬁrm size, the export ratio, labor intensity, the destination of the FDI, and the a$liate’s
rate of return relative to its parent. Demand variables (e.g., market size, GDP per capita) and
cost conditions (e.g., relative wages) do not play a signiﬁcant role in a#ecting a multinational
ﬁrm’s domestic production.
Key words: foreign direct investment, inverse import, and deindustrialization
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I. Motivation
Under rising wages, an appreciating New Taiwan dollar, and a deregulation of foreign
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 46 (2005), pp.65-84.  Hitotsubashi Universityexchange control, Taiwan’s outward direct investment (FDI) started to surge after 1987. By
1989 the total outward FDI had exceeded the accumulated outward investment for the
previous two decades. Outward FDI continued to accelerate and reached a peak of 7.7 billion
U.S. dollars in 2001, of which 38.8% was destined for the PRC (see Appendix I).
1 A similar
trend in the ratio of Taiwan’s FDI to her gross ﬁxed capital formation in the private sector is
also observed. This ratio increased rapidly, from 0.79% in 1987 to a peak of 21.57% in 2001.
The surge of Taiwan’s outward FDI has sparked widespread debate on whether Taiwan’s
economy is hollowing out. The debate has become even more complicated and acute, because
outbound investment has reached an excessively high level and is concentrated too much on
the PRC.
2 For those ﬁrms whose competitive edge would be lost if they remain in Taiwan,
FDI is often defended as a necessary strategy for their growth and development in facing the
contest for worldwide markets. For those ﬁrms who are competitive in world markets, FDI is
regarded as a global logistics strategy aimed at strengthening their competitiveness. However,
from another point of view, FDI not only causes export substitution, but also substitutes for
domestic production, employment, and investment. The continuous drop of manufacturing
employment share in Taiwan after the peak of 35.2% in 1987 seems to provide evidence for
such a view (see Appendix I).
Whether or not foreign a$liates’ production (investment) is a substitute for or a
complement to the parent ﬁrms’ production (investment), employment, and exports has been
extensively discussed in the literature, but the results are inconclusive. The complex channels
through which domestic production and foreign production interact with each other may be an
important contributing factor causing this inconclusiveness. Lipsey and Weiss (1984) and
Svensson (1996), for example, study the relationship between domestic and foreign production
(exports) from the perspective of horizontal or vertical linkage. They show that an increase in
foreign production exerts a negative impact on the domestic production of ﬁnal goods exported
to host markets and third countries, while it spurs the exports of intermediate goods from the
home country. The net e#ect, according to Svensson (1996), is negative.
Lipsey and Weiss (1984), Rugman (1990), and Grubert and Mutti (1991), on the other
hand, consider the demand side. They argue that outward FDI may increase the total demand
for all of the parent ﬁrms’ products through more e$cient and quicker deliveries and
distribution and also the commitment-to-market e#ects on consumers. Under such a situation,
foreign production and domestic production may be complementary. Head and Ries (2001)
consider both the vertical linkage and demand e#ects and identify the conditions under which
a positive or negative relationship between FDI and exports exists. The ﬁnancial side is another
channel through which domestic investment and foreign investment may interact with each
other. As shown by Stevens and Lipsey (1992), domestic investment and foreign investment
are signiﬁcantly, positively correlated, a reﬂection of the same ﬁnancial constraints that a ﬁrm
faces in all its investment decisions. Moreover, according to the OLI theory (Dunning, 1980),
1 The o$cial statistics reported in Appendix 1 seriously underestimate the actual amount of outward investment.
It is said that the o$cial investment statistics for Asia may represent no more than one-ﬁfth of actual investment,
while those for the PRC are only one-tenth.
2 Before 1991 Taiwan’s outward investment concentrated primarily in Southeast Asia and North America.
When the restriction on indirect investment to the PRC was lifted in 1991, mainland China soon became the
largest recipient of Taiwan’s investment, accounting for 38.82% of Taiwan’s outward direct investment for the
period of 1959-2001. See Appendix I.
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production. A ﬁrm with intangible assets, being in the mature stage of a product cycle, and
facing high transaction cost on exports and licensing may locate production abroad rather than
at home, implying a substitution between foreign production and domestic production.
In addition to the above channels, domestic and foreign production may also interact with
each other through the “reverse imports” of a portion of foreign production exported back to
the home market.
3 To maximize its worldwide proﬁt, a multinational ﬁrm, given cost and
demand conditions at home and overseas, will determine domestic production, foreign
production, and reverse imports simultaneously. Reverse imports are thus a natural result of
a ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing behavior. Without taking reverse imports into consideration, the
relationship between domestic and foreign production may be seriously biased.
Reverse imports have been gaining much attention in Taiwan. According to a survey on
FDI by the Ministry of Economic A#airs in 1995, 27% of Taiwanese ﬁrms engaged in the
operation of reverse imports. The average ﬁgure of these reverse imports as the percentage of
their foreign a$liate production is close to 40%, a ﬁgure that is worth serious discussion in the
impacts of outward direct investment on parent production.
Whether an increasing outward FDI hollows out its domestic economy is not just the
concern of Taiwan, but also the concern of many countries (e.g., Japan and Singapore) under
the wave of globalization and the rise of the People’s Republic of China. This paper uses
Taiwan as a case study to examine the inter-relationship between foreign and domestic
production. Unlike previous studies where reverse imports are often ignored, we endogenize
ﬁrms’ decision-making on reverse imports as well as on domestic and foreign production. We
show that the e#ect of foreign production on domestic production may be seriously biased if
reverse imports are not taken into consideration.
In section II we set up a simple theoretical model to examine how the presence of reverse
imports a#ects the relationship between foreign production and domestic production. The
testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical model are modiﬁed to take into account the
heterogeneity of ﬁrms (e.g., ﬁrm size, capital-labor intensity, export ratio, vertical FDI vs.
horizontal FDI, performance of a$liate production, and marketing channel). To test these
hypotheses, we set up an econometric model in section III and run a full information
maximum likelihood regression to solve for the censored and selection problems involved in
the empirical data. Section IV discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes the
paper.
II. The Theoretical Model and Testable Hypotheses
Suppose that there are two types of ﬁrms in the domestic country, H1 and H2. Firm H1 is
a multinational ﬁrm; that is, H1 not only produces Y1 in the domestic country, but also sets up
an a$liate abroad to produce the di#erentiated good Z, of which a portion a will be shipped
back to the home country and the other portion (1a) will be sold in the host market. Ratio
3 We follow the usage of “reverse imports” by Bayoumi and Lipworth (1997). The phenomenon of reverse
imports is also discussed in the standardized stage of the product cycle. See, for example, Vernon (1966), Gagnon
and Rose (1995), and Bayoumi and Lipworth (1997).
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domestic ﬁrm, operates only at home and produces Y2 to compete with Y1, where Y1 and Y2 are
homogeneous.
Let Ci and Fi denote, respectively, the constant marginal cost and the sunk cost of
production for good i, where iY1, Y2, Z.L e tP1 denote the inverse demand for Y1 and Y2, and
P2 and P3 are the inverse demands for the reverse imports of good Z sold in the domestic
market and for good Z sold in the host market, respectively.
4 The proﬁt functions of H1 and
H2 (denoted as p1 and p2) can be written as
p1(P1CY1)Y1(P2CZS)aZ(P3CZ)(1a) ZFY1FZ, (1a)
p2(P1CY2)Y2FY2, (1b)
where S is the unit transportation cost for the reverse imports. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the inverse demand functions are linear: P1a1b1(Y1Y2)r(aZ), P2a2b2
(aZ)r(Y1Y2), P3a3b3(1a)Z, where ai can be used to measure the size of market i,
and r is the extent of product di#erentiation between Y1 (Y2) and the reverse imports aZ.
5
To better understand how a multinational ﬁrm’s decisions on foreign and domestic











From (2a), we see that through reverse imports (aZ), an increase in foreign production Z not
only directly displaces domestic production (the second term), but also lowers the demand for
domestic production (i.e., P1 in the ﬁrst term). Similarly, an increase in domestic production
directly substitutes for reverse imports (the ﬁrst term in (2b)) and indirectly lowers the
demand for reverse imports (the second term in (2b)) and hence has a negative impact on
foreign production. Moreover, (2c) shows that the proﬁt-maximizing reverse-import ratio will
depend on a ﬁrm’s decisions on domestic and foreign production. The above results imply that
domestic production and foreign production will substitute for each other through reverse
imports, and the extent of substitution will depend on the extent of product di#erentiation
between domestic and foreign production (i.e., r).





4 Since national markets are viewed as being segmented by government policies and transport costs, we assume
that H1 is able to discriminate in pricing between countries.
5 When b1b2r, they are perfect substitutes; when r0, they are unrelated.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 02Since the data of Y2 is not available for empirical purposes in the next sections, we will thus
substitute Y2 away from (2a)(2c).
6 Solving Y2 from (2d) and then substituting it into (2a)















20, B32b1(a3a2S)r(a1CY2), and A1a12CY1CY2.
The above equations imply that Z, a,a n dY1 will not only directly interact with each
other, but also indirectly a#ect each other through a change in exogeneous factors such as

































































The larger the host demand is relative to the domestic demand for good Z (i.e., a3/a1), the
more incentive H1 will have to produce abroad. Thus, foreign production (Z) increases, which
in turn raises reverse imports (aZ) and lowers domestic production Y1.
As to the cost factors, the larger the a$liate cost of production is relative to the parent
cost of production (CZ/CY1), the lower the foreign production Z is, but the larger the domestic
production Y1 will be. The reverse-import ratio, however, will not be a#ected directly.
Although an increase in transportation cost (S) increases the cost of reverse imports and has
a negative impact on foreign production and the reverse-import ratio, it has no direct e#ect on
domestic production. Compared to the case where foreign production and domestic produc-
tion are unrelated (i.e., r0), producing a somehow di#erentiated product abroad will not
only reduce a ﬁrm’s foreign production and lower the reverse-import ratio, but also decrease
its domestic production Y1. The above results from the structural form equations (4a)(4c)
are summarized in Table 1. We can also solve (3a)(3c) simultaneously to obtain the
reduced-form equations. See Appendix II for the reduced-form equations as well as their
determinants. The results are also summarized in Table 1.
6 For pure domestic ﬁrms, we only observe that there is no outward investment. However, we cannot observe
whether or not they are expanding their domestic production.
7 (a/(r0, if measured at r0.
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characteristics of parent ﬁrms and a$liates may also a#ect the interrelationship among
domestic production, foreign production, and the reverse-import ratio. In the following, we
ﬁrst discuss the expected e#ects of the parent ﬁrm’s characteristics.
(1) Firm size. Firm size might reﬂect such factors as managerial talent, economies of
scale, the ability to ﬁnance funds internally and externally, and the ability to adopt a global
logistic strategy. We expect that a larger ﬁrm is able to set up a larger scale of production
abroad and thus have a larger foreign production, a higher reverse-import ratio, and a higher
probability to expand its domestic production after increasing its investment abroad, as
compared to a smaller ﬁrm.
(2) Capital-labor intensity. The unit labor cost in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector in-
creased signiﬁcantly from 73.08 in 1987 (1996100) and reached a peak of 101.89 in 1994. In
response to this increasing labor cost, Taiwanese ﬁrms tend to move their labor-intensive stage
of production abroad while keeping the capital-intensive stage of production at home. We thus
expect a ﬁrm with a higher capital-labor intensity at its parent production to have a higher
ratio of foreign production. We also expect that the ﬁrm will expand its domestic investment
after investing abroad as it represents an advantage for it to use Taiwan’s relatively less
expensive factor (i.e., capital) more intensively.
T67A: 1. EME:8I:9 S><CH
Z a Y1
Variables from the theoretical model: Variables from the theoretical model:
1. Structural equation:
Foreign a$liate production,Z ? 
Ratio of reverse imports, a ? 
Domestic production, Y1 
Market size: a3/a1  ? 
Cost factors: CZ/CY1  U 
Transportation cost: S  u
The extent of product di#erentiation: r * * 
2. Reduced-form equation:
Market size: a3/a1  ? 
Cost factors: CZ/CY1 
Transportation cost: S 
The extent of product di#erentiation: r * * 
Firms’ characteristics: Firms’ characteristics:
1. Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics:





Upstream or downstream products vs. Similar products 
Invested in the PRC and Hong Kong 
Performance of foreign production 
Relative rate of return to investment 
Marketing through ﬁrms in Taiwan 
Note: * means if measured at r0.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 1*(3) Export ratio. A ﬁrm’s export ratio reﬂects the extent of its involvement in the
competitive world market. We expect that a ﬁrm with a higher export ratio tends to be more
sensitive to cost factors and thus more likely will substitute low-cost foreign production for
high-cost domestic production. Thus, the export ratio has a positive impact on foreign
production, but a negative impact on domestic production.
As to the a$liate’s characteristics, we consider the following factors:
(1) Labor intensity. As mentioned above, Taiwan no longer has a comparative advantage
in labor-intensive goods. We therefore expect that Taiwan’s outward investment in high
labor-intensive goods tends to more likely substitute for the domestic production of similar
goods either directly or indirectly through reverse imports.
(2) Vertical FDI vs. horizontal FDI. Since trade and FDI substitute for each other under
the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, it implies that a horizontal FDI has a negative impact on
domestic production (Mundell, 1966). Empirical studies such as Lipsey and Weiss (1984),
Svensson (1997), and Head and Ries (2001), on the other hand, show that vertical FDI has
a positive e#ect on domestic production. Combining these lines of studies, we therefore expect
a vertical FDI to have a higher reverse-import ratio as compared with a horizontal FDI.
(3) Investment in the PRC and Hong Kong. To lower the impact of reverse imports from
the PRC, Taiwan’s government adopted a “positive-listing” approach to PRC imports in 1993.
That is, only items listed in the “positive list” are allowed to be imported.
8 The imports from
other countries, however, are basically liberalized. Thus, we expect that the reverse-import
ratio from a$liates in mainland China and Hong Kong is smaller than those from other
countries. Moreover, Taiwan and the PRC share the same culture and language, and we thus
expect investment in mainland China and Hong Kong to be more likely to substitute for
investment in Taiwan as compared to investment in other countries.
(4) Performance of a$liate production and relative rate of return in a$liate operation to
domestic operation. Since good performance of a$liate production adds extra value to the
parent ﬁrm, we expect a ﬁrm with good performance to more likely expand its domestic
production than a ﬁrm with bad performance. However, if the a$liate’s rate of return is better
than domestic production, then the ﬁrm will be less likely to expand its domestic production.
(5) Marketing channel through Taiwan. If the parent ﬁrm in Taiwan takes the main
responsibility of the marketing task for its a$liate’s production, then we expect the reverse
import ratio to be larger than the case where the marketing channel is not through Taiwan.
III. The Empirical Model
In this section we will ﬁrst describe the data we use for this study and then set up an
empirical model to examine the inter-relationship of ﬁrms’ behaviors on foreign production,
reverse imports, and domestic production. We will also test whether the proposed factors in
sections II are statistically signiﬁcant in a#ecting these behaviors.
Our data related to both parent and foreign production are taken mainly from the survey
“Diversiﬁcation and Internationalization in Manufacturing Sectors” conducted by the Minis-
8 Since July 1996, the “positive-listing” approach had been replaced by the “negative-listing” approach to
regulate manufacturing imports from the PRC.
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manufacturing sector and provided information on whether the ﬁrms were engaged in foreign
production or not. If they were, it was then asked what would be the percentage of foreign
a$liate production to their total production, the percentage of reverse imports, the changes in
their domestic production, and the characteristics of their foreign a$liates at the ﬁrm level.
However, the survey did not provide data on the basic characteristics of the parent ﬁrms in
Taiwan in the case of the multinational ﬁrms nor on the changes in the domestic production
in the case of the pure domestic ﬁrms. The characteristics of the parent ﬁrms such as ﬁrm size,
the capital-labor intensity, and the export ratio have therefore been taken from the survey
entitled “The Operations of Industrial and Commercial Corporations,” also conducted by the
Ministry of Economic A#airs in 1994. These two surveys have been merged to obtain 3,520
ﬁrm-level observations. Table 2 summarizes the sample’s basic statistics. The deﬁnitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in Appendix II.
Table 2 shows that out of 3520 sample ﬁrms, 527 ﬁrms (14.95%) have invested abroad.
For these multinational ﬁrms, the average percentage of foreign production relative to their
total production is 30% and the average ratio of reverse imports from foreign a$liates is
10.29%.
Of the 527 multinational ﬁrms, 26.94% are engaged in the operation of reverse imports,
of which the average ratio of reverse imports is 38.20% (column (3) in Table 2). Compared
to multinational ﬁrms with no reverse imports, ﬁrms with reverse imports tend to have a higher
percentage of foreign production (35.19% vs. 28.09%). Moreover, about a quarter of
multinational ﬁrms (24.47%) have decided to expand their scale of domestic production,
18.79% have chosen to contract their domestic production, and the rest (56.74%) have not
changed the scale of domestic production. Multinational ﬁrms that decide to contract their
T67A: 2. SJ7-H6BEA: M:6CH ;DG OJIL6G9 D>G:8I ICK:HIB:CI (FDI),
R:K:GH: IBEDGI, 6C9 DDB:HI>8 PGD9J8I>DC
FDI Reverse Imports (RI) Reverse Imports (RI) Domestic Production Domestic Production
No RI RI Contraction No change Expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of Foreign A$liate Production 30.00% 28.09% 35.19% 58.28% 27.55% 13.99%
Ratio of Reverse Imports 10.29% -- 38.20% 8.10% 10.47% 11.55%
Parent Firm’s characteristics: Parent Firm’s characteristics:
Multinational Firm:
No. of employees (thousands) 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.21 0.30 0.84
Capital-labor ratio 1.02 1.04 0.95 0.75 0.86 1.59
Export ratio 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.52 0.37 0.31
Pure Domestic Firm:
No. of employees (thousands) 0.11 -----
Capital-labor ratio 0.68 -----















Data sources: Computed from the survey of “Diversiﬁcation and Internationalization in Manufacturing
Sectors” taken by the Ministry of Economic A#airs in August 1995, and the survey of “The
Operations of Industrial and Commercial Corporations” conducted by the Ministry of
Economic A#airs Taiwan, R.O.C. in 1994.
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13.99%), as compared to the case of expanding domestic production. The above data statistics
imply that reverse imports seem to play an important role in inﬂuencing the interrelationship
between foreign production and domestic production. In this section we set up an empirical
model to explicitly examine them.
There are two linkages from the theoretical framework in section II to the empirical
model worth noting. First of all, in order to correctly infer the inter-relationships among
foreign production, reverse imports, and domestic production, we take into account the
selectivity bias which may arise from the heterogeneity between domestic ﬁrms and multina-
tional ﬁrms. The ﬁrst equation will then be a censored equation considering both the decision
of investing abroad and the amounts of foreign production. The reverse imports (the second
equation) and domestic production (the third equation) will be observed only when the ﬁrms
become multinational ﬁrms. Secondly, for multinational ﬁrms, their foreign productions,
reverse imports, and domestic productions are simultaneously interrelated among each other
as suggested by the theoretical model in section II. However, due to the selectivity described
above and the partial observability of all the endogeneous variables, reverse imports and
domestic production do not enter the equation of foreign production, and domestic production
does not enter the equation of reverse imports so as to ensure the estimation model is logically
consistent. The proof is provided in Appendix IV. Consequently, the econometric model can
be outlined as follows.
Foreign production: z* iX1ib1e1i, (5a)
Reverse import: a* ig1ziX2ib2e2i,i f z* i0, (5b)
Domestic production: Y* 1ig2zig3aiX3ib3e3i,i f z* i0, (5c)
where i 1, 2,….N. In the above expression, z* i denotes the underlying foreign production for
ﬁrm i; a* i and Y* 1i denote respectively the underlying ratio of reverse imports and the underlying
domestic production and they can be observed only if ﬁrm i’s foreign production is positive.
The vector Xi(X1i,X 2i,X 3i) includes market size, cost factors, the extent of product
di#erentiation, and the ﬁrm’s heterogeneity.
In the regression of foreign production (5a), we consider the behaviors of multinational
ﬁrms as well as pure domestic ﬁrms. We use the percentage of a ﬁrm’s foreign production
relative to its total production as a measure of foreign production (investment) z*. Since z* is
observed only for multinational ﬁrms, z is censored as follows: zz*, if a ﬁrm invests overseas;
z0 otherwise. Foreign production is assumed to be a function of market size and cost
variables, but not a function of domestic production (Y1) and the reverse-import ratio (a),
because of the logistical consistency problem as proved in Appendix IV.
In the regression of reverse imports (5b), a selection problem arises, because the decisions
of the reverse-import ratio (a) are made by multinational ﬁrms only. Moreover, a is censored
as follows: the reverse-import ratio (a*) is observed as a if a multinational ﬁrm has reverse
imports, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the regression of domestic production (5c) also faces a
selection problem, because the data of domestic production (Y* 1i) is available for multinational
ﬁrms only. The domestic production (Y* 1i) is observed as three ordered categories: it falls into
category 1 (Y1i1) if a multinational ﬁrm contracts its domestic production after investing
2005] DJIL6G9 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI, G:K:GH: >BEDGI, 6C9 9DB:HI>8 EGD9J8I>DC - :K>9:C8: 1-abroad; falls into category 2 (Y1i2) if it keeps the same scale of domestic production; and
falls into category 3 (Y1i3) if it expands its domestic production.




ziz* i if z* i0




aia* i if z* i0a n da* i0
ai0i f z* i0a n da* i0
Y1ik if z* i0a n dck1Y* 1ick, k1, 2, 3.
The set of thresholds ck (k0, 1, 2, 3) are constants such that c0, c3,a n dc1c2 are
unknown. Without loss of generality, we normalize c1 to be zero. We assume that the error































































e3i 0, r31s1 r23s2 1
Let I1i1, if a ﬁrm has foreign production; and I1i0 otherwise. Let I2i1, if a ﬁrm has
reverse imports; and I2i0 otherwise. Similarly, let I3ik1, if the domestic production of a
multinational ﬁrm falls in category k;a n dI3ik0 otherwise. Thus, the likelihood function will
have the following expression:


















































where g is the univariate standard normal probability density function (PDF) and f is the
trivariate standard normal PDF. To solve for the endogeneity as well as censored and selection
problems, we maximize equation (6) with respect to all the parameters to obtain the full
information maximum likelihood estimates (FIMLE).
IV. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the empirical results for three cases. In the ﬁrst case (column (1)), we
take foreign production as given and run the regression for domestic production only. It shows
that after controlling for demand and cost conditions and ﬁrms’ characteristics, foreign
production signiﬁcantly substitutes for domestic production at the 1% signiﬁcance level. In the
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 1.second case, we endogenize ﬁrms’ decisions on domestic and foreign production and run these
two regressions simultaneously. Columns (2A) and (2B) display the FIMLE results. Still, we
obtain a signiﬁcant substitution e#ect even when foreign production is endogenized. The signs
of estimates for demand variables (measured by the relative market size and GDP per capita)
and cost variables (measured by relative wage) in the above two cases, however, are
inconsistent with those derived from the theoretical model. For example, the population in the
host market relative to Taiwan (i.e., the relative market size) is shown to have a signiﬁcantly
positive e#ect on domestic production while the relative wage in the host market relative to
that in Taiwan is shown to have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the domestic production.
To understand how the role of reverse imports plays in the relationship of domestic and
foreign production, in the third case we add the regression of the reverse-import ratio to the
system. Columns (3A), (3B), and (3C) report the FIMLE results from maximizing (6). It
turns out that when the reverse-import ratio is endogenized, foreign production has a
signiﬁcantly negative e#ect on the reverse-import ratio, but an insigniﬁcant e#ect on domestic
production, although the latter sign remains negative as that in cases (1) and (2). The
reverse-import ratio, however, does not have a signiﬁcant direct e#ect on domestic production.
The signs of the estimates for the demand and cost variables, which are shown to be
opposite to the theoretical results in the regression of domestic production in cases (1) and (2),
now appear the same as expected for all three regressions ((3A)(3C)). Speciﬁcally, we show
that the larger market size and GDP per capita and the lower labor cost in the host country
have a signiﬁcantly positive e#ect on a ﬁrm’s foreign production and the reverse-import ratio,
but have an insigniﬁcant negative e#ect on domestic production. This implies that even though
the reverse-import ratio does not a#ect the domestic production signiﬁcantly, without taking
reverse imports into consideration will likely lead to biased or even reverse results regarding
the impacts of ﬁrms’ foreign production on domestic production.
Columns (3A)(3C) show that a ﬁrm’s characteristics play signiﬁcant roles on its
decisions of foreign production, the reverse-import ratio, and domestic production. From
column (3A), we show that a Taiwanese ﬁrm with a larger scale in production, higher
capital-labor intensity in technology, and higher export ratios signiﬁcantly increases its
percentage of foreign production. This conﬁrms the popular belief that searching for cheap
labor and a huge host market are the main signiﬁcant factors triggering Taiwan’s outward
direct investment. Column (3B) shows that a Taiwanese ﬁrm with a large production scale and
marketing foreign output through its domestic ﬁrms has a signiﬁcantly larger ratio of reverse
imports. Compared to a horizontal FDI ﬁrm, a Taiwanese ﬁrm with a vertical FDI sig-
niﬁcantly increases its reverse-import ratio which shows a signiﬁcant linkage between foreign
and domestic production through the trade of intermediate inputs. The ratio of reverse imports
from the PRC is lower (though not signiﬁcantly) than that from other countries, a result
reﬂecting Taiwan’s restriction on imports from the PRC.
Column (3C) reveals that although the direct substitution e#ect of foreign production on
domestic production is not signiﬁcant, a signiﬁcant substitution e#ect, however, will come
through a ﬁrm’s characteristics. Speciﬁcally, a Taiwanese ﬁrm’s foreign production will more
likely substitute for its domestic production when the parent ﬁrm in Taiwan is small,
export-oriented, adopting a labor-intensive technology in their foreign production, and invest-
ing in the PRC. Also compared to vertical FDI, horizontal FDI is more likely to be a substitute
for domestic production. Considering that all these situations are in fact quite common in the
2005] DJIL6G9 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI, G:K:GH: >BEDGI, 6C9 9DB:HI>8 EGD9J8I>DC - :K>9:C8: 1/case of Taiwan,
9 the regression result implies a serious problem of displacement by Taiwan’s
production to its overseas production. Moreover, although good performance in overseas
operations signiﬁcantly helps Taiwanese ﬁrms expand their domestic production, a better rate
of return than the parent operation in Taiwan just does the opposite.
In addition to the FIMLE results for the structural-form equation, we also run them for
the reduced-form equations. Table 4 shows that the results for all reduced-form equations are
qualitatively the same as those from the structural-form equations except for the variables of
market size and GDP per capita in the regression of reverse imports. Moreover, for the
sensitivity analysis, we treat foreign production (investment) as a categorical variable (i.e., 1
through 12 indicate di#erent levels of foreign production). The results, which are summarized
in Appendix V, are also qualitatively the same as those discussed above. This shows that our
conclusions are quite robust.
9 About 80.65% of ﬁrms adopt labor-intensive technology in their foreign production. Due to a small market in
Taiwan, most ﬁrms are export-oriented.
T67A: 3. T=: CD:;;>8>:CI EHI>B6I:H (Standard Deviation) D;
Domestic Production Foreign Production Domestic Production
(1) (2A) (2B)
Foreign production 1.80(0.213) *** 1.84(0.249)***
Reverse imports
Constant 1.62(0.378)*** 0.53(0.036)*** 1.59(0.390)***
Relative market size 0.14(0.055)*** 0.14(0.007)*** 0.15(0.058)***
GDP per capita 0.77(0.258)*** 0.92(0.054)*** 0.81(0.278)***
Relative wages 0.72(0.311)*** 1.11(0.063)*** 0.76(0.335)**
Transportation cost 0.21(0.175) 0.22(0.178)
Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics: Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics:
No. of employees (1000 persons) 0.72(0.164)***
Small ﬁrm 0.41(0.129)*** 0.41(0.129)***
Large ﬁrm 0.37(0.141)*** 0.36(0.141)***
Capital-labor ratio 0.59(0.356) 0.16(0.063)*** 0.59(0.357)
Export ratio 0.62(0.156)*** 0.26(0.032)*** 0.61(0.160)***
A$liate’s characteristics A$liate’s characteristics
Labor-intensive 0.42(0.145)*** 0.42(0.145)***
Upstream or downstream products 0.12(0.146) 0.11(0.146)
Investing in the PRC and Hong Kong 0.65(0.273)** 0.64(0.275)**
Performance of foreign production 3.10(0.974)*** 3.10(0.975)***








Number of observations 527 3520
Note: Industry dummies such as textile, electrical, and electronic products are included in the regression.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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Taiwanese ﬁrms have been accelerating their outward direct investment, especially to the
PRC, over the past ten years. Although the government policy of “avoid haste, be patient” to
slow down PRC investment was adopted in 1995, this accelerating trend is likely to continue
in the future. For this reason, the e#ects and the seriousness of this trend on Taiwan’s economy
have become an important issue for Taiwan’s government. In fact, this is not just the concern
of Taiwan, but under the wave of globalization and the rise of the PRC it is also a concern of
Japan and many other countries. Although there have been extensive studies on the e#ect of
foreign a$liate production on domestic production or exports, whether foreign production is
a substitute for or a complement of domestic production is still inconclusive. One di$culty in
reaching conclusive results is due to the complex channels through which foreign production
has an impact on domestic production. Unable to separate the e#ects from di#erent channels
may cause di#erent conclusions to be drawn in di#erent empirical studies. In this paper, by
FIMLE —S IGJ8IJG6A FDGB



























2005] DJIL6G9 9>G:8I >CK:HIB:CI, G:K:GH: >BEDGI, 6C9 9DB:HI>8 EGD9J8I>DC - :K>9:C8: 11using Taiwan as a case study and by incorporating demand and cost conditions and ﬁrms’
characteristics, we examine the interrelationship between domestic production and foreign
production with a special focus on the channel of reverse imports.
We show that when the reverse-import ratio is endogenized, foreign production does not
signiﬁcantly substitute for domestic production even though the reverse-import ratio is shown
to have an insigniﬁcant e#ect on domestic production. This is in contrast to the case where the
reverse-import ratio is not endogenized and as a result the signiﬁcant substitution e#ect at the
1% signiﬁcance level is obtained. Unlike the case where the reverse-import ratio is not
endogenized and inconsistent results are derived, the e#ects of market size, GDP per capita,
and relative wage on domestic production also turn out to be consistent with those expected.
All these results imply that by excluding reverse imports from the regression, we are likely to
obtain biased or even reverse results.
Although foreign production does not signiﬁcantly substitute for domestic production
directly, it may substitute for domestic production indirectly through ﬁrms’ characteristics.
The substitution e#ect is more likely to occur when parent ﬁrms are small, export-oriented,
adopting labor-intensive technology in their foreign production, and investing in similar







Constant 0.53(0.036)*** 0.28(0.247) 2.37(0.380)***
Relative market size 0.14(0.007)*** 0.001(0.039) 0.10(0.056)*
GDP per capita 0.92(0.052)*** 0.02(0.198) 0.79(0.304)***
Relative wages 1.10(0.059)*** 0.06(0.242) 1.16(0.382)***
Transportation cost 0.17(0.144) 0.27(0.210)
Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics: Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics:
No. of employees (1000 persons) 0.70(0.152)***
Small ﬁrm 0.01(0.003) 0.36(0.125)***
Large ﬁrm 0.04(0.089) 0.22(0.131)*
Capital-labor ratio 0.16(0.079)** 0.03(0.264) 0.24(0.295)
Export ratio 0.26(0.034)*** 0.18(0.105)* 0.91(0.153)***
A$liate’s characteristics A$liate’s characteristics
Labor-intensive 0.10(0.093) 0.40(0.142)***
Upstream or downstream products 0.34(0.083)*** 0.15(0.154)
Investing in the PRC and Hong Kong 0.04(0.182) 0.43(0.240)*
Performance of foreign production 0.21(0.601) 2.82(0.950)***
Relative rate of return 0.60(0.437) 2.23(0.749)***







Number of observation 3520
Note: Industry dummies such as textile, electrical, and electronic products are included in the regression.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
two-tailed test.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 12products and in the PRC. Considering the fact that in 1995, 80.82% of multinational ﬁrms
were small ﬁrms with fewer than 100 employees in Taiwan, 76.09% were investing in similar
products abroad, and 54.65% were destined to invest in the PRC, the total substitution e#ect
may therefore be signiﬁcant to some extent in the case of Taiwan. A more recent survey shows
that the structure of Taiwan’s outward direct investment in 2000 has switched from small ﬁrms
toward large ﬁrms and is concentrated on the PRC. Furthermore, over 55% of Taiwanese
multinational ﬁrms are small ﬁrms, around 70% of investment cases are horizontal FDI, and
more than 73.6% are destined for the PRC. All this may help explain why along with an
increase in outward direct investment, the unemployment rate in Taiwan continues to increase.
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1959-79 59.3 0 72.68 14.84 12.48 - -
1980 42.1 0 7.60 76.25 16.15 0.65 32.9
1981 10.8 0 62.04 14.81 23.15 0.16 32.4
1982 11.6 0 78.45 21.55 0 0.19 31.8
1983 10.6 0 62.26 27.36 10.38 0.17 32.3
1984 39.3 0 16.79 77.61 5.60 0.54 34.2
1985 41.3 0 10.17 86.44 3.39 0.62 33.7
1986 56.9 0 14.76 80.84 4.39 0.73 34.1
1987 102.8 0 20.72 68.19 11.09 0.88 35.2
1988 218.7 0 31.69 56.38 11.93 1.38 34.6
1989 931.0 0 31.84 54.64 13.52 4.76 33.9
1990 1552.2 0 38.84 27.62 33.54 8.51 32.0
1991 1830.2 9.52 50.80 16.27 23.41 9.56 30.8
1992 1134.3 21.78 32.61 17.01 28.60 4.22 29.9
1993 4829.3 65.61 13.74 10.96 9.70 15.66 28.4
1994 2579.0 37.31 21.69 5.58 35.42 7.64 27.8
1995 2449.6 44.61 19.09 10.13 26.17 6.33 27.1
1996 3394.6 36.21 19.49 7.99 36.30 9.07 26.7
1997 7228.1 59.96 11.33 7.57 21.14 17.26 28.0
1998 5330.9 38.17 10.89 11.23 39.71 12.87 28.1
1999 4521.8 27.71 18.50 9.84 43.95 10.71 27.7
2000 7684.2 33.93 11.08 11.21 43.78 15.5 28.0
Source: Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, Outward Investment, Indirect Mainland
Investment, R.O.C., May 2001. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2002.
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where A2a1CY12CY2, B2b1(a2CZs) r(a1CY1), and D2b1b2r
20. Here, we
assume that b3B2(a3CZ) D20 to ensure a positive Z. Moreover, we assume B20t o
ensure a positive a.














































































0, if measured at r0.







Fraction of foreign a$liate production relative to the total




































































Dummy; 1 if the number of employees in parent ﬁrm














Dummy; 1, if parent ﬁrm produces similar products as














Dummy; 1 if parent ﬁrm or other ﬁrms in Taiwan takes the
main responsibility of marketing task for foreign







Category; 0.1 if planning to close down; 0.2 if bad;







The relative rate of return of foreign a$liate production vs.
domestic production; 0.1 if terrible; 0.2 if worse; 0.3 if the
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As deﬁned before, let I3i11 if a multinational ﬁrm has contracted its domestic produc-
tion, and I3i10 otherwise. Let I3i31 if a multinational ﬁrm has expanded its domestic
production, and I3i10 otherwise. Consider the following model where a ﬁrm’s reverse
imports (ai) and domestic production (I3i1 and I3i3) enter the equation of foreign production
(z* i) and domestic production (I3i1 and I3i3) enters the equation of reverse imports (a* i).:
Foreign production: z* ig1aig2I3i1g3I3i3X1ib1e1i,
Reverse import: a* ig4zig5I3i1g6I3i3X2ib2e2i,i f z* i0,




ziz* 1 if z* i0




aia* i if z* i0a n da* i0
ai0i f z* i0a n da* i0
Y1ik if z* i0a n dck1Y* 1ick, k1,2,3.
The joint probability distribution of (zi, ai, Y1i) is then given by the following expressions:










 f(zig2X1ib1, e2i, e3i) de2ide3i





r7ziX3ib3 f(ziX1ib1, e2i, e3i) de2ide3i





cr7ziX3ib3 f(zig3X1ib1, e2i, e3i) de2ide3i
Prob (z* i0, a* i0, Y* 1i0)
g7zig8aiX3ib3
 f(zig1aig2X1ib1, aig4zig5X2ib2, e3i)de3i
Prob(z* i0, a* i0, 0Y* 1ic)  
cg7zig8aiX3ib3
g7zig8aiX3ib3 f(zig1aiX1ib1, aig4ziX2ib2, e3i)de3i
Prob(z* i0, a* i0, cY* 1i)  

cg7zig8aiX3ib3 f(zig4zig6X1ib1, aig4zig6X2ib2, e3i)de3i
The conditions for logical consistency is then g1g2g3g5g60.
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Foreign production 0.05* 0.14***
Reverse imports 0.02
Constant 6.87*** 1.02*** 2.54***
Relative market size 1.95*** 0.12** 0.10**
GDP per capita 13.41*** 0.83** 0.25***
Relative wages 1.20*** 0.93**
Transportation cost 0.19*
Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics: Parent ﬁrm’s characteristics:
No. of employees (1000 persons) 11.92*** 1.13*
Small ﬁrm 0.46***
Large ﬁrm 0.39***
Capital-labor ratio 2.16* 0.42*
Export ratio 3.52*** 0.74***
A$liate’s characteristics A$liate’s characteristics
Labor-intensive 0.07 0.46***
Upstream or downstream products 0.35*** 0.18
The PRC and Hong Kong 0.07 0.74***
Textiles 0.07 0.15
Electrical and electronic products 0.18*** 0.10
Performance of foreign production 3.61***
Relative rate of return 2.72***







Number of observations 3520
Note: Industry dummies such as textile, electrical, and electronic products are included in the regression.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
two-tailed test.
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